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We develop a simple model of the exchange rate in which agents optimize their portfolio and use 
different forecasting rules. They check the profitability of these rules ex post and select the more 
profitable one. This model produces two kinds of equilibria, a fundamental and a bubble one. In 
a stochastic environment the model generates a complex dynamics in which bubbles and crashes 
occur at unpredictable moments. We contrast these "behavioural" bubbles with "rational" 
bubbles. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A bubble is:”... a sharp rise in price of an asset or a range of assets in a contin-
uous process, with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and
attracting new buyers-generally speculators, interested in proﬁts from trading
in the asset rather than its use as earning capacity”- Kindleberger(1978). Since
the publication of Kindleberger’s ”Manias, Panics, and Crashes” in 1978, a large
literature has ﬂourished on bubbles and crashes in ﬁnancial markets. Two key
questions have been analysed in this literature. One is whether bubbles can
occur in theory; the other is whether they occur in practice. In this paper we
will analyse the ﬁrst question.
In order to analyse the question of whether bubbles can occur in theory
one has to be precise about what exactly is a bubble. With the introduction of
rational expectations in economic models, a bubble was given a precise meaning.
It is well-known that a rational expectations model produces inﬁnitely many
solutions for the asset price. One is the ”fundamental” solution, and the other
(in fact inﬁnitely many) is the bubble solution. The latter is an explosive path
of the asset price that increasingly deviates from the fundamental, but that
continues to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. Clearly such a deﬁnition of a
bubble is not interesting in a perfect foresight environment because it means
that either the bubble goes on indeﬁnetely, or if a crash is expected at some
future date, the bubble will not start (because of backward induction). This has
led to the eﬃcient market view that bubbles cannot occur.
The insight provided by Blanchard and Watson (see Blanchard(1979), Blan-
chard and Watson(1982)) was to formulate a bubble theory in a stochastic en-
vironment , and to assume that when the asset price is on an explosive bubble
path, rational agents expect a future crash but do not know its exact timing
. This analysis came to the conclusion that a bubble, deﬁn e da sa ne x p l o s i v e
path of the asset price, is a theoretical possibility. The analysis of Blanchard and
Watson has spurred a large literature extending this initial insight and analysing
the conditions for the emergence of bubbles in rational expectations models1.
The discovery that bubbles can arise in rational expectations models is im-
portant. Yet this ”rational bubble” theory is not all together satisfactory. The
weak part of the rational bubble theory is in the modelling of the crash. The
latter is introduced in an ad-hoc fashion, i.e. agents are assumed to expect a
crash, although this expectation does not come from the structure of the model
itself. It is based on some ”reasonable” but model-exogenous assumption that
bubbles cannot go on forever.
A further extension of the rational bubble theory consisted in allowing for
heterogeneity of traders. Models were developed in which rational traders in-
teract with ”noise traders” (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann(1990),
Shleifer and Vishny(1997)). The essence of these models is that some constraints
1There have been extensions of the basic model in general equilibrium settings. In such
an environment it can be shown that the existence of a substitute asset or a ﬁnite number of
agents prevents bubbles from occurring. But then there will be no crash either. For example,
there will be no ﬁnancial crises (see Tirole(1982)).
2exist on the capacity of the rational traders to exploit the proﬁt opportunities
generated by the bubble. These limits to arbitrage arise because of risk aversion
or capital constraints. More recently, Abreu and Brunnermeier(2003) have de-
veloped models in which the arbitrage failure by rational traders arises because
they have diﬀerent views about the timing of the crash and fail to synchronize
their exit strategies.
The rational expectations deﬁnition of a bubble as an unstable path of the
asset price is not the only possible deﬁnition of a bubble. In this paper we use an
alternative deﬁnition, i.e. a bubble as a ﬁxed point equilibrium. This deﬁnition
arises quite naturally in a model that departs from the rational expectations
assumption. We develop a simple model of the asset price in which all agents
are ”boundedly rational”, i.e. we assume that because individual agents have a
limited ability to process and to analyse the available information, they select
simple forecasting rules. These agents, however, exhibit rational behaviour in
the sense that they check the proﬁtability of these rules and are willing to switch
to the more proﬁtable one. Thus, they use the best possible strategies within the
conﬁnes of their limited ability to analyse and to use the available information.
This approach has been referred to as ”bounded rationality” (see Simon(1955),
Johansen and Sornette(1999)). It is also very much inﬂuenced by the liter-
ature of ”behavioural ﬁnance” (Tversky and Kahneman(1981), Thaler(1994),
Shleifer(2000), Kahneman(2002), Barberis and Thaler(2002)).
Thus, our model also departs from the more recent extensions of the rational
bubble theory in the context of models in which some agents are rational and
others are not (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann(1990), Shleifer and
Vishny(1997), and Abreu and Brunnermeier(2003)). We feel that the distinction
between rational and non-rational agents, although useful, creates fundamental
epistemological issues that are not fully addressed and diﬃcult to resolve. Why is
it that some agents are rational and others are not? Since the diﬀerence between
rational and non-rational behaviour is quite fundamental, it raises issues about
whether there are two fundamentally diﬀerent types of human beings in society.
And if these types exist, how they are selected. In order to avoid these deep
issues, we prefer to use a model in which all agents are boundedly rational.
We will show that in such a model two types of equilibria exist, a fundamental
equilibrium and a bubble equilibrium. The latter will be shown to be a ﬁxed
point equilibrium. We will then analyse the nature of these bubble equilibria
and the conditions in which they are working as attactors. The model will be
formulated in the context of the exchange market. Its basic structure can also
be applied to other asset markets.
2 The model
In this section we develop the simple version of the exchange rate model. As
will be seen, the model can be interpreted more generally as a model describing
any risky asset price. The model consists of three building blocks. First, utility
maximising agents select their optimal portfolio using a mean-variance utility
3framework. Second, these agents make forecasts about the future exchange rate
based on simple but diﬀerent rules. In this second building block we introduce
concepts borrowed from the behavioural ﬁnance literature. Third, agents evalu-
ate these rules ex-post by comparing their risk-adjusted proﬁtability. Thus, the
third building block relies on an evolutionary economics.
2.1 The optimal portfolio
We assume agents of diﬀerent types i depending on their beliefs about the future
exchange rate. Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic (risk-free) asset










t+1 is the wealth of agent of type i at time t +1 , Et is the expecta-
tion operator, µ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and V i(Wi
t+1) represents the










where r and r∗ are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates
(which are known with certainty), st+1 i st h ee x c h a n g er a t ea tt i m et +1 , di,t
represents the holdings of the foreign assets by agent of type i at time t.T h u s ,
the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of 2 represents the value of the (risky)
foreign portfolio expressed in domestic currency at time t +1while the second
term represents the value of the (riskless) domestic portfolio at time t +1 2.
Substituiting equation 2 in 1 and maximising the utility with respect to di,t









i,t =( 1+r∗)2V i
t (st+1). The optimal holding of the foreign asset depends
on the expected excess return (corrected for risk) of the foreign asset. The market
demand for foreign assets at time t is the sum of the individual demands, i.e.:
N X
i=1
ni,tdi,t = Dt (4)
2The model could be interpreted as an asset pricing model with one risky asset (e.g. shares)
and a risk free asset. Equation (2) would then be written as
Wi







where st+1is the price of the share in t+1 and yt+1is the dividend per share in t+1.
3If the model is interpreted as an asset pricing model of one risky asset (shares) and a risk






4where ni,t is the number of agents of type i.
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market
supply Zt w h i c hw ea s s u m et ob ee x o g e n o u s 4.T h u s ,
Zt = Dt (5)
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the
market equilibrium equation and solving for the exchange rate st yields the



































Thus the exchange rate is determined by the expectations of the agents, Ei
t ,
about the future exchange rate. These forecasts are weighted by their respective
variances σ2
i,t. When agent’s i forecasts have a high variance the weight of this
agent in the determination of the market exchange rate is reduced. In the
following we will set r = r∗.
2.2 The forecasting rules
We now specify how agents form their expectations of the future exchange rate
and how they evaluate the risk of their portfolio.
We start with an analysis of the rules agents use in forecasting the exchange
rate. We take the view that individual agents are overwhelmed by the complex-
ity of the informational environment, and therefore use simple rules to make
forecasts. Here we describe these rules. In the next section we discuss how
agents select the rules.
We assume that two types of forecasting rules are used. One is called a
”fundamentalist” rule, the other a ”technical trading” rule5. The agents using
a fundamentalist rule, the ”fundamentalists”, base their forecast on a compari-
son between the market and the fundamental exchange rate, i.e. they forecast
the market rate to return to the fundamental rate in the future. In this sense
they use a negative feedback rule that introduces a mean reverting dynamics in
the exchange rate. The speed with which the market exchange rate returns to
the fundamental is assumed to be determined by the speed of adjustment in the
goods market which is assumed to be in the information set of the fundamental-
ists (together with the fundamental exchange rate itself). Thus, the forecasting
4The market supply is determined by the net current account and by the sales or purchases
of foreign exchange of the central bank. We assume both to be exogenous here. In section 9
we will endogenize the current account.
5The idea of distinguishing between fundamentalist and technical traders rules was ﬁrst
introduced by Frankel and Froot(1986).










t i st h ef u n d a m e n t a le x c h a n g er a t ea tt i m et , which is assumed to follow
a random walk and 0 < ψ < 1. We assume that the fundamental exchange
rate is exogenous. We return to this issue in a later section. Note also that when
fundamentalists forecast the future exchange rate they use information up to
period t − 1. Agents do not know the full model structure. As a result, they
cannot compute the equilibrium exchange rate of time t that will be the result
of their decisions made in period t.
The agents using technical analysis, the ”technical traders”, forecast the
future exchange rate by extrapolating past exchange rate movements. Their






Thus, the technical traders compute a moving average of the past exchange rate
changes and they extrapolate this into the future exchange rate change. The
degree of extrapolation is given by the parameter β. Technical traders take into
account information concerning the fundamental exchange rate indirectly, i.e.
through the exchange rate itself. In addition, technical rules can be interpreted
as rules that attempt to detect ”market sentiments”. In this sense the technical
trader rules can be seen as reﬂecting herding behaviour6.
It should be stressed that both types of agents, technical traders and funda-
mentalists, use partial information. Thus our approach diﬀers from the approach
in the tradition of rational expectations models in which an asymmetry in the
information processing capacity of agents is assumed. In the latter approach
some agents, the ”rational” ones, are assumed to use all available information,
while other agents, ”noise traders”, do not use all available information. Such
an asymmetry is usually made in order to facilitate the mathematical analysis
of the models. However, the basis on which such an asymmetry can be invoked
remains unclear. In contrast with this tradition, we take the view that the in-
formational complexity is similar for all agents, and that none of them can be
considered to be superior on that count.
We now analyse how fundamentalists and technical traders evaluate the risk
of their portfolio. The risk is measured by the variance terms in equation 6,
which we deﬁne as the weighted average of the squared (one period ahead)








t−k−1 (st−k) − st−k
¤2
(9)
6There is a large literature on the use of technical analysis. This literature makes clear that
technical trading is widely used in the foreign exchange markets. See Cheung and Chinn(1989),
Taylor and Allen(1992), Cheung et al(1999), Mentkhoﬀ(1997) and (1998).
6where θk = θ(1 − θ)k−1 are geometrically declining weights (0 < θ < 1) ,
and i = f,c.
2.3 Fitness of the rules
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the ﬁtness of
these two forecasting rules. The general idea that we will follow is that agents
use one of the two rules, compare their (risk adjusted) proﬁtability ex post and
then decide whether to keep the rule or switch to the other one. Thus, our
model is in the logic of evolutionary dynamics, in which simple decision rules
are selected. These rules will continue to be followed if they pass some ”ﬁtness”
test (proﬁtability test). Another way to interpret this is as follows. When great
uncertainty exists about how the complex world functions, agents use a trial
and error strategy. They try a particular forecasting rule until they ﬁnd out
that other rules work better. Such a trial and error strategy is the best strategy
agents can use when cannot understand the full complexity of the underlying
model.
In order to implement this idea we use an approach proposed by Brock and
Hommes(1997) which consists in making the weights of the forecasting rules a



































f,t−1 are the risk adjusted net proﬁts made by technical
traders’ and fundamentalists’ forecasting the exchange rate in period t − 1, i.e.
π0
c,t−1 = πc,t−1 − µσ2
c,t−1 and π0
f,t−1 = πf,t−1 − µσ2
f,t−1.
Equations 10 and 11 can be interpreted as switching rules. When the risk
adjusted proﬁts of the technical traders’ rule increases relative to the risk ad-
justed net proﬁts of the fundamentalists rule, then the share of agents who
switches and use technical trader rules in period t increases, and vice versa.
This parameter γ measures the intensity with which the technical traders and
fundamentalists revise their forecasting rules. With an increasing γ agents react
strongly to the relative proﬁtability of the rules. In the limit when γ goes to
inﬁnity all agents choose the forecasting rule which proves to be more proﬁtable.
When γ is equal to zero agents are insensitive to the relative proﬁtability of the
rules. In the latter case the fraction of technical traders and fundamentalists
is constant and equal to 0.5.T h u s ,γ is a measure of inertia in the decision to
7This speciﬁcation of the decision rule is often used in discrete choice models. For an ap-
p l i c a t i o ni nt h em a r k e tf o rd i ﬀerentiated products see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse(1992).
The idea has also been applied in ﬁnancial markets, by Brock and Hommes (1997) and by
Lux(1998).
7s w i t c ht ot h em o r ep r o ﬁtable rule8. As will be seen, this parameter is of great
importance in generating bubbles.
We depart from the Brock-Hommes approach in the way we deﬁne proﬁts. In
Brock-Hommes proﬁts are deﬁned as the total earnings on the optimal foreign
asset holdings. We deﬁne the proﬁts as the one-period earnings of investing $1
in the foreign asset. More formally,
πi,t =[ st (1 + r∗) − st−1 (1 + r)]sgn
£
(1 + r∗)Ei








0 for x =0
−1 for x<0
and i = c,f
Thus, when agents forecasted an increase in the exchange rate and this
increase is realized, their per unit proﬁt is equal to the observed increase in the
exchange rate (corrected for the interest diﬀerential). If instead the exchange
rate declines, they make a per unit loss which equals this decline (because in
this case they have bought foreign assets which have declined in price).
We use a concept of proﬁts per unit invested for two reasons. First, our
switching rules of equations 11 and 10 selects the ﬁttest rules. It does not
select agents. To make this clear, suppose that technical traders happen to
have more wealth than fundamentalists so that their total proﬁts exceeds the
fundamentalists’ proﬁts despite the fact that the technical rule happens to be
less proﬁtable (per unit invested) than the fundamentalist rule. In this case,
our switching rule will select the fundamentalists rule although the agents who
u s et h i sr u l em a k el e s sp r o ﬁts (because their wealth happens to be small) than
agents using chartist rules. Second, in our deﬁnition of proﬁts agents only have
to use publicly available information, i.e. the forecasting rules and the observed
exchange rate changes. They don’t have to know their competitor’s proﬁts.
3 Solution of the model
In this section we investigate the properties of the solution of the model. We ﬁrst
study its deterministic solution. This will allow us to analyse the characteristics
of the solution that are not clouded by exogenous noise. The model consists of
equations (6) to (11).
3.1 The steady state
The non-linear structure of our model does not allow for a simple analytical
solution. Hereby, we analyse the steady state of a simpliﬁed version of the
model. For the sake of simplicity we assume that technical traders only take
one lag into account9. In addition, we set Z =0 , and normalize the fundamental
8The psychological literature reveals that there is a lot of evidence of a ”status quo bias”
in decision making (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler(1991). This implies γ < ∞. Thus we
set 0 < γ < ∞.
9One can easily add additional lags without altering the steady state analysis.
8rate, s∗
t = s∗ =0 . W ec a nt h e nw r i t ee q u a t i o n6a sf o l l o w s :


































Equations 9 deﬁning the variance terms can also be rewritten as follows:
σ2




t−2 (st−1) − st−1
¤2 (17)
σ2





t−2 (st−1) − st−1
i2
(18)
Using the deﬁnition of the forecasting rules 7 and 8, this yields
σ2
c,t =( 1− θ)σ2
c,t−1 + θ[(1 + β)st−3 − βst−2 − st−1]
2 (19)
σ2
f,t =( 1− θ)σ2
f,t−1 + θ[(1 − ψ)st−2 − st−1]
2 (20)
With suitable changes of variables it is possible to write the system as a
6-dimensional system. Set
ut = st−1
xt = ut−1(= st−2)
The 6 dynamic variables are (st,u t,x t,πc,t,σ2
c,t,σ2
f,t). The state of the sys-
tem at time t−1, i.e. (st−1,u t−1,x t−1,z t−1,πc,t−1,σ2
c,t−1,σ2
f,t−1) determines the
state of the system at time t, i.e. (st,u t,x t,πc,t,σ2
c,t,σ2
f,t) through the following
6-D dynamical system:
st =[ 1+β − Θf,t(ψ + β)]st−1 − (1 − Θf,t)βut−1 (21)
ut = st−1 (22)
9xt = ut−1 (23)
πc,t =( st − st−1) sgn [(ut−1 + β(ut−1 − xt−1) − st−1)(st − st−1)] (24)
σ2
c,t =( 1− θ)σ2
c,t−1 + θ[(1 + β)ut−1 − βxt−1 − st−1]
2 (25)
σ2
f,t =( 1− θ)σ2



























πf,t−1 =( st−1 − ut−1)sgn [((1 − ψ)xt−1 − ut−1)(st−1 − ut−1)] (29)
It can now be shown that the model produces two types of steady state
solutions. We analyse these consecutively.
3.1.1 The exchange rate equals the fundamental value.
We normalise the fundamental to be zero. Thus, this solution implies that
st =0 . As a result, the variance terms go to zero. This also means that in the
steady state, the risk adjusted weights of the fundamentalists and chartists are
of the form Θf,t = ∞
∞ and Θc,t = ∞
















One can show by numerical methods that in the steady state the expression
σ2
f,t/σ2
c,t converges to 110. We show this in appendix 1 ( to be included) where
we plot the ratio as a function of time. This implies that in the steady state
Θf,t = wf,t and Θc,t = wc,t .(Note that wf,t + wc,t =1 ) .
The steady state of the system is now obtained by setting
(st−1,u t−1,x t−1,πc,t−1,σ2
f,t−1,σ2





in the dynamical system (21)-26).
10It does not appear to be possible to show this by analytical methods.
10There is a unique steady state where
s,u,x =0 , πc =0 ,σ2
f,σ2
c =0








i.e. the steady state is characterized by the exchange rate being at its funda-
mental level, by zero proﬁts and zero risk, and by fundamentalist and technical
trader fractions equal to 1
2.
3.1.2 The exchange rate equals a non-fundamental value
The model allows for a second type of steady state solution. This is a solu-
tion in which the exchange rate is constant and permanently diﬀerent from its
(constant) fundamental value. In other words the model allows for a constant
non-zero exchange rate in the steady state.
The existence of such an equilibrium can be shown as follows. We use 13 and
set st = st−1 = st−2 = s, so that
−Θf,tψs =0 (32)
It can now easily be seen that if Θf,t =0 , any constant exchange rate
will satisfy this equation. From the deﬁnition of Θf,t we ﬁnd that a suﬃcient
condition for Θf,t to be zero is that σ2
f,t = σ2
f > 0, and σ2
c,t = σ2
c =0 .N o t e
that in this case Θc,t =1and σ2
f = ψ
2s2. Put diﬀerently, there exist ﬁxed point
equilibria in the steady state with the following characteristics: the exchange
rate deviates from the fundamental by a constant amount; thus, fundamentalist
forecasting rules lead to a constant error and therefore the risk adjusted share
of fundamentalist rules is zero. The latter is necessary, otherwise agents would
still be using the rule so that their forecast of a reversion to the fundamental
would move the exchange rate.
We will call this non-fundamental equilibrium a bubble equilibrium. We call
it a bubble equilibrium because it is an equilibrium in which fundamentalists
exert no inﬂuence on the exchange rate. It should be stressed that this deﬁni-
tion of a bubble is very diﬀerent from the rational bubble which is deﬁned as an
unstable path of the exchange rate. It comes closer to the notion of ”sunspots”
which is also an equilibrium concept in rational expectations models (see Blan-
chard and Fischer(1989), p255). We will come back to this in section 9 where
we will contrast our bubble equilibria with sunspot equilibria.
With this dynamical system it is not possible to perform the local stability
analysis of the steady state with the usual techniques, based upon the analysis of
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state. The reason
is that the “map” whose iteration generates the dynamics is not diﬀerentiable
at the steady state (in fact the map is not diﬀerentiable, for instance, on the
locus of the phase-space of equation s = u, and the steady state belongs to this
subset of the phase space).
113.2 Numerical analysis
The strong non-linearities make an analysis of the model’s global stability im-
possible. Therefore, we use simulation techniques which we will present in this
and the following sections. We select ” reasonable” values of the parameters, i.e.
those that come close to empirically observed values. In appendix we present
a table with the numerical values of the parameters of the model and the lags
involved. As we will show later, these are also parameter values for which the
model replicates the observed statistical properties of exchange rate movements.
We will also analyse how sensitive the solution is to diﬀerent sets of parameter
values. The dynamical model used in the numerical analysis is the same one as
in the previous section except for the number of lags in the technical traders’
forecasting rule. We now return to the speciﬁcation of the technical traders’s
rule as given by 8. As a result, (13) becomes




where T =5 . Thus, the full model with all its lags is a 10-dimensional
dynamic system.
In ﬁgure 1 we show the solutions of the exchange rate for diﬀerent initial con-
ditions. On the horizontal axis we set out the diﬀerent initial conditions. These
are initial shocks to the exchange rate in the period before the simulation is
started11. The vertical axis shows the solutions corresponding to these diﬀerent
initial conditions. These were obtained from simulating the model over 10000
periods. We found that after such a long period the exchange rate had stabilized
to a ﬁxed point (a ﬁxed attractor). The fundamental exchange rate was nor-
malized to 0.W eﬁnd the two types of ﬁxed point solutions that we discussed
in the previous section. First, for small disturbances in the initial conditions
the ﬁxed point solutions coincide with the fundamental exchange rate. We call
these solutions the fundamental solutions. Second, for large disturbances in the
initial conditions, the ﬁxed point solutions diverge from the fundamental. We
will call these attractors, bubble attractors12. It will become clear why we label
these attractors in this way. The larger is the initial shock (the noise) the farther
the ﬁxed points are removed from the fundamental exchange rate. The border
between these two types of ﬁxed points is characterised by discontinuities. This
has the implication that in the neighbourhood of the border a small change in
the initial condition (the noise) can have a large eﬀect on the solution.We return
to this issue. The diﬀerent nature of these two types of ﬁxed point attractors
can also be seen from an analysis of the technical traders’ weights that corre-
spond to these diﬀerent ﬁxed point attractors. We show these technical traders’
11There are longer lags in the model, i.e. ﬁve Thus we set the exchange rate with a lag
of more than one period before the start equal to 0. This means that the initial conditions
are one-period shocks in the exchange rate prior to the start of the simulation. All the other
lagged dynamic variables are set equal to 0 when the simulation is started.
12We use the word ”bubble” in a diﬀerent way than in the rational expectations literature.
We discuss this in a later section.
12weights as a function of the initial conditions in ﬁgure 2.
We ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that for small initial disturbances the technical traders’ weight
converges to 50% of the market. Thus when the exchange rate converges to the
fundamental rate, the weight of the technical traders and the fundamentalists
are equal to 50%. For large initial disturbances, however, the technical traders’
weight converges to 1. Thus, when the technical traders take over the whole mar-
ket, the exchange rate converges to a bubble attractor. The meaning of a bubble
attractor can now be understood better. It is an exchange rate equilibrium that
is reached when the number of fundamentalists has become suﬃciently small
(the number of chartists has become suﬃciently large) so as to eliminate the
eﬀect of the mean reversion dynamics. It will be made clearer in the next sec-
tion why fundamentalists drop out of the market. Here it suﬃces to understand
that such equilibria exist. It is important to see that these bubble attractors are
ﬁxed point solutions. Once we reach them, the exchange rate is constant. The
technical traders’ expectations are then model consistent, i.e. technical traders
who extrapolate the past movements, forecast no change. At the same time,
since the fundamentalists have left the market, there is no force acting to bring
back the exchange rate to its fundamental value. Thus two types of equilibria
exist: a fundamental equilibrium where technical traders and fundamentalists
co-exist, and a bubble equilibrium where the technical traders have crowded
out the fundamentalists13. In both cases, the expectations of the agents in the
model are consistent with the model’s outcome.
These two types of equilibria diﬀer in another respect. The fundamental
equilibrium can be reached from many diﬀerent initial conditions. It is locally
stable, i.e after small disturbances the system returns to the same (fundamental)
attractor. In contrast there is one and only one initial condition that will lead
to a particular bubble equilibrium. This implies that a small disturbance leads
to a displacement of the bubble solution. Note also that the border between
these two types of equilibria is characterized by discontinuities and complexity,
i.e. small disturbances can lead to either a fundamental or a bubble equilib-
rium. We show the nature of this complexity in the ﬁgures 3 and 4. These
present two successive enlargements of ﬁgure 1 around the initial condition, 5,
where the fundamental and bubble equilibria appear to overlap. We observe that
small changes in the initial conditions can switch the equilibrium point from a
fundamental to a bubble equilibrium, and vice versa.The second enlargement
shows the replicating nature of the enlargements. The ”holes” in the line seg-
ment describing the fundamental equilibrium in the ﬁrst enlargement are now
ﬁlled up with fundamental equilibria that were not visible in the ﬁrst enlarge-
ment. Thus, we ﬁnd that in the border region between fundamental and bubble
equilibria there is sensitivity to initial conditions, i.e. trivially small shocks can
lead to switches in the nature of the equilibrium to which the exchange rate is
attracted. This also suggests that these ﬁxed point attractors are surrounded
13Note that the intermediate points, i.e. when chartists’ weight is less than 1 the solution
has not converged yet to ﬁxed points. Fundamentalists hold a very small share in the market
which exerts some mean reverting force. However their inﬂuence is oﬀset by the chartists
pressure. In ﬁgure 2 the simulation results are for T=100000.
13Figure 1:
Figure 2:
14by basins of attraction that are separated by complex borders. We will return
to informational issues produced by this result.
4 The anatomy of bubbles and crashes
In the previous section we identiﬁed the existence of two diﬀerent types of ﬁxed
point solutions, i.e. a fundamental solution characterised by the fact that the
exchange rate converges to its fundamental value while technical traders and
fundamentalists ”co-habitate”, and a bubble solution in which the exchange rate
deviates from its fundamental value and in which technical traders dominate the
market. In this section we show that in combination with stochastic shocks in
the fundamental exchange rate these features of the model lead to the emergence
of bubbles and crashes. Again we selected a particular set of parameter values.
In section 5 we present a sensitivity analysis.
We start by presenting a case study of a typical bubble and crash scenario as
produced by the stochastic version of the model. Figure 5 top panel shows the
exchange rate and its fundamental value in the time domain; the bottom panel
s h o w st h ew e i g h to ft h ec h a r t i s t si nt h es a m et i m ed o m a i n .T h e s et w op i c t u r e s
allow us to analyse a number of common features of a typical endogenously
generated bubble and crash in a stochastic environment.
First, once a bubble emerges, it sets in motion bandwagon eﬀects. As the
exchange rate moves steadily in one direction, the use of extrapolative forecast-
ing rules becomes more proﬁtable, thereby attracting more technical traders
in the market. This is clearly visible from a comparison of the bottom panel
with the top panel of ﬁgure 5. We observe that the upward movement in the
exchange rate coincides with an increase in the weight of technical traders in
the market. We have checked this feature in many bubbles produced by the
model. In appendix 1 we show another example of a bubble, and we present the
results of a causality test ( correct it according to uppsala) which shows that
the exchange rate leads the weight of technical traders during a bubble and
the subsequent crash. Thus, typically a bubble starts after the exchange rate
has moved in one direction, thereby attracting extrapolating technical traders
which, in turn, reinforces the exchange rate movement.
Second, a sustained upward (downward) movement of the exchange rate will
not develop into a full scale bubble if at some point the market does not get suﬃ-
ciently dominated by the technical traders. As can be seen ﬁgure 5 at the height
of the bubble the technical traders have almost 100% of the market. Put diﬀer-
ently, an essential characteristic of a bubble is that at some point most agents
are not willing to take a contrarian fundamentalist view. The market is then
dominated by agents who extrapolate the bubble into the future. This raises
the question of why fundamentalists do not take an opposite position thereby
preventing the bubble from developing. After all, the larger the deviation of
the exchange rate from the fundamental the more the fundamentalists expect




17leave the marketplace to the technical traders. The reason is twofold. First, dur-
ing the bubble phase the proﬁtability of technical trading increases dramatically
precisely because so many technical traders enter the market thereby pushing
the exchange rate up and making technical trading more proﬁtable. Second,
during the bubble phase fundamentalists make large forecasting errors, reduc-
ing their ”appetite” for using fundamentalists forecasting rules. Put diﬀerently,
during the bubble phase the riskiness of taking a fundamentalist position (as
measured by forecast errors) increases dramatically relative to the riskiness of
extrapolative forecasting. As a result, of these two eﬀects fundamental investors
who are continuously acting against the trend will tend to drop out. There is
therefore a self-fulﬁling dynamics in the proﬁtability of technical trading and
losses for the fundamentalists.
The limit of this dynamics is reached when technical traders have crowded
out the fundamentalists. We arrive at our next characteristics of the bubble-
crash dynamics. When the technical traders’ share is close to 100% the self-
reinforcing upward movement in the exchange rate and in proﬁtability slows
down, increasing the relative proﬁtability of fundamentalists. An exogenous
shock, e.g. a shock in the fundamental, can then trigger a fast decline in the
share of technical trading, back to its normal level of a tranquil market. A crash
is set in motion. We come back to issue of why a crash must necessarily occur
in this model.
The dynamics of bubbles and crashes we obtain in our simulated data is
asymmetric, i.e. bubbles are relatively slow and crashes relatively rapid. An
intuitive explanation of this result is that during a bubble technical traders’
and fundamentalists’ rules push the exchange rate in two diﬀerent directions,
i.e. the positive feedback from technical traders and the negative feedback from
fundamentalists have the eﬀect of slowing down the build-up of a bubble. In a
crash the fundamentalists’ mean reverting force is reinforced by the technical
traders’ behaviour. As a consequence, the speed of a crash is higher than the
speed with which a bubble arises.
This asymmetry between bubbles and crashes is a well-known empirical phe-
nomenon in ﬁnancial markets (see Sornette(2003)). In ﬁgure 6 we present the
DEM-USD for the period 1980-1987, which is a remarkable example of a bubble
in foreign exchange markets. As it can be seen from ﬁgure 6 the upward move-
ment in the DEM-USD exchange rate is gradual and builds up momentum until
a sudden and much faster crash occurs which brings the exchange rate back to
its value of tranquil periods. Our model provides a simple explanation for this
empirical phenomenon14.
14Note the contrast with rational expectations models of bubbles and crashes. These predict
that bubbles and crashes are symmetric (Blanchard(1979) and Blanchard&Watson(1982))
M o r e o v e r ,t h es y m m e t r yo fb u b b l e sa n dc r a s h e sn e g l e c t st h et i m es c a l ed y n a m i c si nw h i c ha
long term change is an accumulation of short term changes. Thus, the symmetry property in
foreign exchange markets is an approximation which holds only in the (very) short-run (see










































5 Sensitivity analysis: the deterministic model
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis of the deterministic model. This
will allow us to describe how the space of fundamental and bubble equilibria is
aﬀected by diﬀerent values of the parameters of the model. In this section we
concentrate on two parameters, i.e. β (the extrapolation parameter of techni-
cal traders) and γ (the sensitivity of technical traders and fundamentalists to
relative proﬁtability).
5.1 Sensitivity with respect to β
We show the result of a sensitivity analysis with respect to β in ﬁgure 7, which
is a three-dimensional version of ﬁgure 1. The ﬁxed attractors (i.e. the solutions
of the exchange rate) are shown on the vertical axis. The initial conditions are
s h o w no nt h ex - a x i sa n dt h ed i ﬀerent values for β on the z-axis. Thus, the two-
dimensional ﬁgure 1 in section 3 is a ’slice’ of ﬁgure 7 obtained for one particular
value of β (0.8 in ﬁgure 1).
We observe that for suﬃciently low values of β we obtain only fundamental
equilibria whatever the initial conditions. As β increases the plane which repre-
sents the collection of the fundamental equilibria narrows. At the same time the
space taken by the bubble equilibria increases, and these bubble equilibria tend
to increasingly diverge from the fundamental equilibria. Thus as the extrapo-
lation parameter increases, smaller and smaller shocks in the initial conditions
will push the exchange rate into the space of bubble equilibria. Put diﬀerently,
as β increases, the probability of obtaining a bubble equilibrium increases.
19Note also that the boundary between the fundamental and the bubble equi-
libria is a complex one. The boundary has a fractal dimension. We return to
this issue in section 9.
5.2 Sensitivity with respect to γ
The parameter γ is equally important in determining whether fundamental or
bubble equilibria will prevail. We show its importance in ﬁgure 8, which presents
a similar three-dimensional ﬁgure relating the ﬁxed attractors to both the ini-
tial conditions and the values of γ.W e ﬁnd that for γ =0or close to 0,a l l
equilibria are fundamental ones. Thus, when agents are not sensitive to chang-
ing proﬁtability of forecasting rules, the exchange rate will always converge to
the fundamental equilibrium whatever the initial condition. As γ increases, the
space of fundamental equilibria shrinks. With suﬃciently high values of γ, small
initial disturbances (noise) are suﬃcient to push the exchange rate into a bub-
ble equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, as γ increases, the probability of obtaining a
bubble equilibrium increases. Finally, as in the case of β,w ea l s oo b s e r v et h a t
the boundary between the bubble and fundamental equilibria is complex.
6 The frequency of bubbles
In the previous section we described the zones of attraction around fundamental
and bubble equilibria in a deterministic environment. In a stochastic environ-
ment the exchange rate will constantly be ”thrown around” in these diﬀerent
zones of attraction. It is threfore useful to simulate the model in a stochastic
environment to ﬁnd out how frequently the exchange rate will be attracted by
bubble equilibria.
We analyse this issue by simulating the stochastic version of the model and
by counting the number of periods the exchange rate is involved in a bubble. We
deﬁne a bubble here to be a deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamen-
tal value by more than three times the standard deviation of the fundamental
variable for a signiﬁcant interval of time. We have set this interval equal to 20
periods. We show the result of such an exercise in ﬁgure 9 for diﬀerent values
of the chartists’ extrapolation parameter β and the rate of revision γ.I ts h o w s
the percentage of time the exchange rate is involved in a bubble dynamics. We
observe that when β and γ are small the frequency of the occurrence of bubbles
is small. The frequency of bubbles increases exponentially with the size of the
parameters β and γ. Thus, the extrapolation by chartists β and the rate of
revision γ are important parameters aﬀecting the frequency with which bubbles
occur.
The previous results allow us to shed some additional light on the nature
of bubbles and crashes. As we have seen before, bubbles arise because agents
are attracted by the risk-adjusted proﬁtability of the extrapolating (technical
traders) rule, and this attraction in turn makes this forecasting rule more prof-




dynamics to work, agents’ decision to switch must be suﬃciently sensitive to
t h er e l a t i v er i s k - a d j u s t e dp r o ﬁtabilities of the rules. If it is not the case, no
bubble equilibria can arise. The larger is γ t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st h a tt h e s es e l f -
fulﬁlling bubble equilibria arise. The interesting aspect of this result is that in a
world where agents are very sensitive to changing proﬁt opportunities, bubbles
become more likely than in a world where agents do not react quickly to these
new proﬁt opportunities15.
7 Permanent shocks and bubbles
In his classic book ”Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial Crises”
Kindleberger identiﬁe so n es o u r c eo ft h ee m e r g e n e n c eo fb u b b l e si nt h es t o c k
markets to be a shock such as a technological innovation or an institutional
change that aﬀect the the long run proﬁtability prospects of ﬁrms. We checked
whether this historical analysis of the emergence of bubbles is mimicked in our
model. The way we did this is to assume that a positive and permanent shock
o c c u r si nt h ef u n d a m e n t a lv a l u eo ft h ea s s e tp r i c e( t h ee x c h a n g er a t e ) .W es e t
this shock equal to +4. It occurs at the start of the simulation. We then analysed
t h es o l u t i o n so ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ef o rd i ﬀerent initial shocks (noise) and for dif-
ferent values of β. The results are shown in ﬁgure 10. We have indicated the
15The policy implication of this result is that by increasing the inertia in the system so
that agents react less quickly to changes in relative proﬁtabilities of forecasting rules, the
authorities could reduce the probability of the occurrence of bubbles. How this can be done
and whether some form of taxation of exchange transactions can do this, is a question we
want to analyse in future research.
22new and permanent value of the fundamental exchange rate by the vertical plane
through +4. We observe an important asymmetry in the space of fundamental
and bubble equilibria. Compared to the symmetric case of ﬁgure 7, the hor-
izontal plane collecting the fundamental equilibrium has shifted to the left16.
This means that relatively small positive noise in the initial conditions leads
to bubble equilibria for all values of β, while one needs large negative noise to
obtain (negative) bubble equilibria. Thus the model predicts that when a pos-
itive shock occurs in the fundamental, the probability of obtaining a (positive)
bubble equilibrium increases.
Figure 10:
This result may also explain why in stock markets positive bubbles appear
to be more common than negative bubbles. In a growing economy, positive and
permanent shocks in the fundamental occur more frequently than negative ones.
Our model then predicts that in such an environment positive bubbles will arise
more frequently than negative ones. Note that, in the foreign exchange market,
a positive bias in the fundamental shocks is less likely to occur, because the
fundamental exchange rate is the result of a diﬀerential between domestic and
foreign variables. Thus, bubbles in the foreign exchange markets are more likely
to be both negative and positive ones.
8 Why crashes occur
The model makes clear why bubbles arise in a stochastic environment. It may
not be clear yet why bubbles are always followed by crashes. Here again shocks
16Note that the horizontal plane has also shifted upwards by +4, but this is not very visible.
23in the fundamental are of great importance. In order to analyse this issue we
performed the following experiment. We ﬁxed the initial condition at some value
(+5) that produces a bubble equilibrium (for a given parameter conﬁguration).
We then introduced permanent changes in the fundamental value (ranging from
-10 to +10) and computed the attractors for diﬀerent values of β. We show the
r e s u l t so ft h i se x e r c i s ei nﬁgure 11. On the x-axis we show the diﬀerent fun-
damental values of the exchange rate, while on the y-axis we have the diﬀerent
values of β. The vertical axis shows the attractors (exchange rate solutions). The
upward sloping plane is the collection of fundamental equilibria. It is upward
sloping (45%) because an increase in the fundamental rate by say 5 leads to an
equilibrium exchange rate of 5. For low values of β we always have fundamental
equilibria. This result matches the results of ﬁgure 7 where we found that for
low β’s all initial conditions lead to a fundamental equilibrium.
The major ﬁnding of ﬁgure 11 is that when permanent shocks in the fun-
damental are small relative to the initial (temporary) shock, (+5) we obtain
bubble equilibria. The corollary of this result is that when the fundamental
shock is large enough relative to the noise, we obtain a fundamental equilib-
rium. Thus if an initial temporary shock has brought the exchange rate in a
bubble equilibrium, a suﬃciently large fundamental shock will lead to a crash.
In a stochastic environment in which the fundamental rate is driven by a ran-
dom walk (permanent shocks), any bubble must at some point crash because
the attactive forces of the fundamental accumulate over time and overcome the
temporary dynamics of the bubble.
The interesting aspect of this result is that the crash occurs irrespective of
whether the fundamental shock is positive or negative. Since we have a positive
bubble, it is easy to understand that a negative shock in the fundamental can
trigger a crash. A positive shock has the same eﬀect though. The reason is
that a suﬃciently large positive shock in the fundamental makes fundamentalist
forecasting more proﬁtable, thereby increasing the number of fundamentlists in
the market and leading to a crash (to the new and higher fundamental rate). Put
diﬀerently, while in the short run, chartists exploit the noise to start a bubble,
in the long run when the fundamental rate inexorably moves in one or the other
direction, fundamentalists forecasting becomes attractive.
It is also interesting to note that as β increases, the size of the shocks in the
fundamental necessary to bring the exchange rate back to its fundamental rate
increases. In a stochastic environment this means that bubbles will be stronger
and longer-lasting when β increases.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that shocks in fundamentals both act as
triggers for the emergence of a bubble (see previous section) and as triggers
for its subsequent crash. The intuition can be explained as follows. When the
exchange rate is in a fundamental equilibrium, an unexpected and permanent
increase in the fundamental, sets in motion an upward movement of the ex-
change rate towards the new fundamental. This is the result of the action by
fundamentalists. This upward movement, however, also makes extrapolative
forecasting (technical trading) increasingly proﬁtable and can lead to a bubble.
When the exchange rate is in a bubble equilibrium, a large enough (positive
24Figure 11:
or negative) shock in the fundamental strenghtens the hand of fundamentalists’
forecasting, and attracts agents towards this forecasting rule. This then leads
to a crash.
As in the case of the bubble, the prediction of the timing of the crash is made
diﬃcult because of the fuzziness (complexity) of the border between bubble and
fundamental equilibria (ﬁgure 11). Thus, although crashes are inevitable, their
exact timing is unknown. The remarkable aspect of this result is that it is
obtained in a deterministic model.
9 Rational versus ”behavioural” bubbles
We can now contrast the diﬀerence between rational bubbles and the bubbles
obtained in our model, which we will label ”behavioural” bubbles. A rational
bubble is obtained in a model in which agents use all available information
including the underlying structure of the model and in which they know the
distribution of the underlying stochastic variables. In such a model bubbles
are movements of the exchange rate (asset price) along an explosive path. The
latter is one of the inﬁnitely many unstable solutions obtained in a rational
expectations model.
Although it is easy to model a bubble in a rational expectations model, it is
less easy to model a crash. In a perfect foresight model a bubble with a crash
cannot exist because when the timing of the crash is known (and by deﬁnition
this is known in a perfect foresight model) agents will anticipate this and by
backward induction prevent the bubble from happening. The insight provided
25by Blanchard and Watson(1982) was to show that a bubble followed by a crash
is possible in a stochastic rational expectations model. The crash occurs in such
a model because agents attach some positive probability of a future crash. As
a result, inevitably at some point a probable event becomes reality and a crash
occurs. Agents, however, cannot predict when this will happen. The uncertainty
about the exact time of the crash is necessary to make a rational bubble possible.
We argued earlier that the rational bubble theory has no good explanation of
why crashes occur17. The only reason why these occur is that they are assumed
to occur. The assumption that crashes must occur sounds reasonable since whe
have not observed an everlasting bubble. It is, however, imposed in an ad-
hoc way, from outside the model18. In models where rational and non-rational
agents interact (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann(1990), Shleifer and
Vishny(1997), and Abreu and Brunnermeier(2003)), bubbles arise because of a
failure of arbitrage by the rational agents. However, these models also assume
that crashes occur for exogenous reasons.
Another implication of the rational bubble model is that the exchange rate
(asset price) is always on a bubble path. The reason is that the fundamental
solution has a knife-edge property (saddle path). This means that the slightest
deviation from the fundamental path brings the exchange rate on an unstable
path. In a stochastic environment these slight deviations are inevitable. Thus
the rational bubble theory predicts that the exchange rate will permanently be
on a bubble path.
In our model a bubble is an equilibrium (a ﬁxed point attractor) to which the
exchange rate is attracted if exogenous shocks brings it in the basin of attraction
of the bubble equilibrium. At the same time the fundamental equilibrium is
locally stable. This makes the behavioural bubble fundamentally diﬀerent from
the rational bubble. First, in our behavioural model one needs a suﬃciently
large shock away form the fundamental to move the exchange rate towards a
bubble attractor. Thus in ”normal” times the exchange rate is driven by its
fundamental value. This contrasts with the rational bubble theory in which
the fundamental equilibrium is unstable, so that the exchange rate is always
on an unstable bubble path. Second, the forces that lead to a bubble are the
same as the forces that lead to a crash. We showed that large shocks in the
fundamental increase the probability of the occurrence of a bubble. Once in
a bubble equilibrium a suﬃciently large shock in the fundamental leads to a
17The Blanchard-Watson rational bubble model can also be criticised for the fact that it
predicts the occurrence of bubbles whose features are not found in empirical evidence. For
example, it predicts that the bubbles are exponentially distributed, whereas the empirical
evidence suggests that there are fat tails in the distribution of bubbles (see Mandelbrot(1997)
and Lux and Sornette (2002)). In addition, the rational bubble model predicts that there is
symmetry between bubble and crash phases, i.e. that after the crash the asset price returns
to its fundamental value. Again, this does seem to square with the empirical evidence (see
Sornette(2003)).
18There is an important literature analysing the conditions under which rational bubbles
occur in general equilibrium models. In general, the conditions for such bubbles to occur
are tighter in these models than in partial equilibrium models because of some ﬁniteness
condition(e.g. a ﬁnite number of individuals, see Tirole(1982)). Typically these models have
not been concerned with an explicit modelling of the crash.
26crash. In this sense our model provides for a theory of both the occurrence of
a bubble and its subsequent crash. Third, the timing of the bubble and of the
crash is uncertain. This uncertainty is not imposed exogenously but comes from
the structure of the model. For we have shown that the basins of attraction
around the fundamental and the bubble equilibrium have a fractal nature. As a
result, the exact timing of the bubble and of the crash is dependent on ”trivial
events”.
The view of a bubble as an equi:librium concept is reminiscent of the notion
of ”sunspots” which is also an equilibrium concept in rational expectations mod-
els (see Blanchard and Fischer(1996), p255, and Azariadis and Guesnerie(1984)).
Sunspot equilibria arise because some agents believe that an arbitrary variable
(sunspots) inﬂuences the asset price. As a result, rational agents who know
this, attach some probability that a sunspot equilibrium will be reached. In our
model a bubble equilibrium exists because some agents use extrapolative fore-
casting rules which under certain conditions can crowd out agents who believe
in the existence of a fundamental value of the exchange rate. Thus, a bubble
equilibrium is possible not because some agents are irrational and believe that
sunspots aﬀect the exchange rate, but because these agents are agnostic about
the existence of fundamentals (including sunspots), and therefore rely only on
t h ep a s te x c h a n g er a t em o v e m e n t sa st h es o u r c eo ft h e i ri n f o r m a t i o n .
10 Informational issues
The model developed in this paper can be used to illustrate the nature of the
informational problem rational agents face. We have used a model in which
the informational assumption is that agents cannot comprehend and process
the full complexity of the environment they face, and therefore use an informa-
tional strategy that consists in trying simple forecasting rules, subjecting these
ex post to a ﬁtness criterion. The results of the model suggest that this is the
right strategy to follow. For despite its simplicity, our model creates an infor-
mational environment that is too complex to understand and to process for an
individual agent. To see this let us return to ﬁgure 7 and concentrate on the pa-
rameter values that lie close to the boundary between fundamental and bubble
equilibria. Suppose rational agents in need of forecasting, use the information
provided by the underlying model. They have estimated β to be 0.815 with a
standard error of 0.005 (a remarkable econometric feat). Suppose then that the
initial condition happens to be +5. One is tempted to think that this should be
suﬃcient information to predict with reasonable certainty whether the exchange
rate will be attracted by a fundamental or by a bubble equilibrium. In order to
c h e c kw h e t h e rt h i si st h ec a s ew et a k ea” s l i c e ”o fﬁgure 7 at the initial condition
= +5. We show this in ﬁgure 12(a).
We observe that with a value of β around 0.815 we can have a fundamental
or a bubble equilibrium. In order to see clearer, we enlarge the ﬁgure so that
we obtain the ﬁxed attractors for values of β between 0.81 and 0.82. The result
is given in ﬁgure 12(b). Thus, even with such a sharp estimate of β agents will
27be uncertain whether a fundamental or bubble equilibrium will prevail. We ﬁnd
that there are 22 fundamental and 78 bubble equilibria within the estimated
range of β’s.
Suppose, now that a new econometric technique allows these agents to re-
duce the standard error by a factor of 10 so that they now estimate β to be
located between 0.8145 and 0.8155. It would now appear from the previous ﬁg-
ure 12(b) that agents can increase the precision with which they can predict the
probability of a bubble equilibrium. This conclusion would be incorrect, how-
ever. We show this by enlarging the ﬁgure 12(b) around the parameter value
of β =0 .815. The result is shown in ﬁgure 12(c). We observe that the higher
precision of the estimate of β has not increased the precision with which agents
can predict whether a fundamental or a bubble equilibrium will prevail. Within
that narrower range of estimated βsw en o wﬁnd 23 bubble equilibria (out of
100). Successive further enlargements around 0.815 show that this proportion
remains approximately constant. This result has to do with the fractal nature of
the boundary between the fundamental and bubble equilibria. Every successive
enlargement will reveal the same structure. The agents would need inﬁnite pre-
cision to be able to predict whether with a given initial condition, a particular
parameter value will lead to a bubble equilibrium.
This problem is compounded by the fact that the ”border values” of β depend
on the initial shock. We show this by ”cutting another slice” from ﬁgure 7 at
the initial condition equal to +6. We show the result in ﬁgure 13. We ﬁnd that
with this new initial condition, the border values of β are located around 0.75,
with a similarly complex feature.
We conclude that agents need inﬁnite precision in their knowledge of the
initial conditions and the parameter β (and in fact also the other parameters
o ft h em o d e l )t ob ea b l et op r e d i c tw h e t h e rt h ee x c h a n g er a t ew i l lm o v et oa
fundamental or a bubble equilibrium. Put diﬀerently, inﬁnitesimally small errors
in computing the initial conditions or in estimating β (and the other parameters)
lead to very large errors in predicting the exchange rate. Thus,even in the very
simple model we developed here, individual agents face enormous informational
problems, that they cannot hope to solve. This helps to understand why rational
agents will not attempt to use all the information provided by the underlying
structural model.
This result is quite essential for the logical consistency of our model. For
suppose we had found that instead of being fuzzy, the border between funda-
mental and bubble equilibria was given by a continuous line. In that case it
would indeed have been quite irrational for agents in the model not to try to
estimate the position and the shape of that line. Being a good econometrician
w o u l dh a v ep a i do fi ns u c ham o d e l .I ti sn o ti no u rm o d e l .
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Up to now theoretical analysis of bubbles and crashes has been done almost
exclusively in the context of rational expectations models. This has led to the
theory of rational bubbles. In this paper we use an alternative framework in
which agents are boundedly rational. We apply this framework to analyse the
emergence and the subsequent disappearance of bubbles in the foreign exchange
market. The analysis could easily be extended to other asset markets.
The special feature of our model is that individual agents recognize that
they are not capable of understanding and processing the complex information
structure of the underlying model. As a result, they use simple rules to forecast
the exchange rates. None of these rules is rational in the technical sense. Yet we
claim that these agents act rationally within the context of the uncertainty they
face (bounded rationality). That is, agents check the ’ﬁtness’ (proﬁtability) of
the forecasting rule at each point in time and decide to reject the rule if it is less
proﬁtable (in a risk adjusted sense) than competing rules. Our model is in the
tradition of evolutionary dynamics where agents use trial and error strategies.
We assume that some of the forecasting rules are based on extrapolating past
exchange rate movements (technical trading) and others are based on mean
reversion towards the fundamental rate (fundamentalism).
The model generates two types of equilibria. The ﬁrst one, which we called
a fundamental equilibrium, is one in which the exchange rate converges to its
fundamental value. The exchange rate, however, can also converge to a second
type of equilibrium, which we called a bubble equilibrium, and which is reached
in a self-fulﬁlling manner. An important feature of the bubble equilibrium is that
technical traders (extrapolative forecasting) take over most of the market, so
that fundamental inﬂuences on the exchange rate disappear. We simulated the
model in a stochastic environment and generated complex scenarios of bubbles
30and crashes. One interesting aspect of the model is that it explains both the
emergence of the bubble and its subsequent crash. That is, we found that the
forces that trigger the emergence of a bubble are the same as those that lead
to its collapse. This contrasts with the rational bubble model that has found it
diﬃcult to explain a crash.
We also analysed under what conditions bubbles and crashes occur. We
found that when agents react strongly to changing relative proﬁtabilities of the
diﬀerent forecasting rules, the frequency of bubbles increases. Similarly, when
technical analysts tend to extrapolate past movements of the exchange rate
aggressively, the probability of bubbles and crashes increases.
Our model also conﬁrms what has been noted by economic historians, i.e.
that bubbles typically arise in the wake of a large shock in a fundamental variable
(e.g. a new technological development). We found that large positive shocks in
the fundamental increases the probability of a bubble dynamics.
We also analysed the existence of a mean reverting process. This occurs when
fundamentalists’ risk preception is aﬀected by the degree of ”misalignment” of
the asset price. When this happens the dynamics of bubbles and crashes is
altered.
The theory of bubbles and crashes that we propose in this paper is diﬀerent
from the rational bubbles theory developed in the context of rational expecta-
tions models. The diﬀerence exists at two levels. First, in our model bubbles are
equilibria (ﬁxed point attractors). These can be reached because certain shocks
lead ”fundamentalists” to be crowded out by technical traders in a self-fulﬁlling
manner. One needs a suﬃciently large shock in the fundamental variables, how-
ever, for this to happen. This contrasts with the rational bubble theory which
deﬁnes a bubble as an explosive path of the asset price. Since the fundamental
equilibrium path is unstable (knife-edge) the asset price will be permanently
involved in an explosive bubble and crash dynamics in a stochastic rational
equilibrium model.
Our bubble equilibria are also diﬀerent from sunspot equilibria which arise
in rational expectations models when some (irrational) agents give importance
to some arbitrary variables (sunspots) in the determination of the asset price. In
contrast to these sunspot equilibria, our bubble equilibria arise because some-
times the market is dominated by agents who are agnostic about the fundamen-
tal variables that drive the asset price.
The theory of bubbles and crashes proposed in this paper diﬀers from the
rational bubble theory in a second and more profound manner. Rational expec-
tations models of bubbles that have gone beyond the Blanchard-Watson model,
invariably have been based on a dichotomy between types of agents assumed
i nt h em o d e l ,w h e r e b yo n et y p ei sa s s u m ed to be rational and to understand
the complexity of the world, while another type consists of irrational agents.
This dichotomy between rational and irrational agents who operate in the same
model creates the issue of why society is divided between agents with completely
diﬀerent intellectual capacities. Is this a diﬀerence in genetic characteristics? Or
is it related to diﬀerences in education? These are unsurmountable problems.
They can be avoided by making a simpler assumption about human society.
31This is that all agents have limited capabilities in understanding the world. In-
stead of assuming that some agents are rational and others are not, it seems
more reasonable to assume that all agents are boundedly rational. This is what
we have done in this paper. Paradoxically, assuming bounded rationality for all
agents turns out to be less ad-hoc than assuming that some agents are rational
and others are not. The assumption of bounded rationality generates a simpler
and, therefore, more poweful model.
3212 References
Abreu, D. and Brunnermeier, M., 2003, Bubbles and Crashes, Econometrica,
71(1), 173-204.
Anderson, S., de Palma, A., Thisse, J.-F., 1992, Discrete Choice Theory of
Product Diﬀerentiation, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Bacchetta, P. and van Wincoop E., 2003, Can information heterogeneity
explain the exchange rate determination puzzle?, NBER working paper 9498.
Blanchard ,O.J., 1979, ” Speculative bubbles, crashes and rational expecta-
tions”, Economics Letters, 3, 387-389.
Blanchard, O.J., and Fischer, S., 1989, Lectures on Macroeconomics, MIT
press.
Blanchard, O.J., and Watson, M.W., 1982, ”Bubbles, rational expectations
and speculative markets”, in Wachtel, P., eds., Crisis in economic and ﬁnancial
stucture: bubbles, bursts, and shocks. Lexington books: Lexington.
Brock, W., and Hommes, C., 1997, A Rational Route to Randomness, Econo-
metrica, 65, 1059-1095
Brock, W., and Hommes, C.,1998, Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos
in a simple asset pricing model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
22, 1235-1274.
Brunnermeier, M., 2001, Asset pricing under asymmetric information: bub-
bles, crashes technical analysis and herding, Oxford University Press.
Cheung, Y., and Chinn, M., (1989), Macroeconomic Implications of the Be-
liefs and Behavior of Foreign Exchange Traders, mimeo, University of California,
Santa Cruz.
Cheung, Y., Chinn, M., and Marsh, (1999), How Do UK-Based Foreign
Exchange Dealers Think Their Markets Operates?, CEPR Discussion Paper,
no. 2230
Chiarella, C., Dieci, R., Gardini, 2002, L., “Speculative behaviour and com-
plex asset price dynamics”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation.
Copeland, L., 2000, Exchange Rates and International Finance, 3rd ed.,
Prentice Hall.
De Grauwe, P. , Dewachter, H., and Embrechts, 1993, M., Exchange Rate
Theories. Chaotic Models of the Foreign Exchange Markets, Blackwell.
De Grauwe, P., and Grimaldi, M., Exchange Rate Puzzles. 2003, A Tale of
Switching Attractors, paper presented at the EEA Meeting, Stockholm, 2003
de Vries, C., 2000, ”Fat tails and the history of the guilder”, Tinbergen
Magazine, 4, Fall, pp. 3-6.
De Long, J., Bradford, B., Schleiﬀer and Summers, L., 1990, ”Noise Trader
Risk in Financial Markets”, Journal of Political Economy.
Dornbusch R., 1976, ”Expectations and exchange rate dynamics”, Journal
of Political Economy 84.
Engel C. and Morley J., 2001, ”The adjustment of prices and the adjustment
of the exchange rate”, Discussion paper, Department of Economics, University
of Wisconsin.
33Evans, M., and Lyons, R., 1999, ”Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynam-
ics”, NBER Working Paper, no. 7317.
Evans, G., and Honkapohja, S., 2001, Learning and Expectations in Macro-
economics, Princeton University Press.
Frankel, J., and Froot, K., 1986, ”The Dollar as a Speculative Bubble: A
Tale of Fundamentalists and Chartists”, NBER Working Paper, no. 1963.
Garber,P.M., 2000, ”Famous ﬁrst bubbles”, MIT press.
Guillaume D., 1996 ”Chaos, randomness and order in the foreign exchange
markets” PhD Thesis K.U.Leuven
Huisman, R., Koedijk, K., Kool, C., and Palm, F., 2002, The tail-fatness of
FX returns reconsidered, in De Economist, 150, no. 3, September, 299-312.
Isard, P., 1995, Exchange Rate Economics, Cambridge University Press.
Johansen,A., Sornette,D., 1999, Modeling the stock market prior to large
crashes, The European Physical Journal B, 9, 167-174.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., and Thaler, R., 1991, The endowment eﬀect,
loss aversion and status quo bias, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 193-206.
Kahneman, D., Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive
Judgment and Choice, Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8, Stockholm.
Kandel,E. and Pearson, N.D., 1995, ”Diﬀerential interpretation of public
signals and trade in speculative markets”, Journal of political Economy, 4, 831-
872.
Kindleberger, C,. Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial
Crises. 1978, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 263 pages.
Kurz, M., 1994, ”On the Structure and Diversity of Rational Beliefs”, Eco-
nomic Theory, 4, 877-900.
Kurz, M., and Motolese, M., 2000, ”Endogenous Uncertainty and Market
Volatility”, mimeo, Stanford University.
Lui, Y., and Mole, D., The Use of Fundamental and Technical Analyses
by Foreign Exchange Dealers: Hong Kong Evidence, Journal of International
Money and Finance, 17, pp. 535-45
Lux T., 1998, ”The socio-economic dynamics of speculative markets: inter-
acting agents, chaos, and fat tails of return distributions”, Journal of Economic
Behaviour and Organisation, vol.33.
Lux T., Marchesi M., 2000, ”Volatility clustering in ﬁnancial markets: a
microsimulation of interacting agents”, International Journal of Theoretical and
Applied Finance.
Lux T., Sornette D., 2002, "On rational bubbles and fat tails", Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 34, No 3, pp 589-610.
Lyons, R., 2001, The Microstructure Approach to Exchange Rates, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Mandelbrot, B., 1963, The variation of certain speculative prices, The Jour-
nal of Business, University of Chicago, 36, 394-419.
Mandelbrot, B., 1997, Fractals and Scaling in Finance, Springer Verlag, 551
pages.
Meese, R., and Rogoﬀ, 1983, ”Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Sev-
enties: Do they Fit Out of Sample?”, Journal of International Economics, 14,
343-24.
Mentkhoﬀ, L., (1997), Examining the Use of Technical Currency Analysis,
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 2, pp. 307-18
Mentkhoﬀ, L., (1998), The Noise Trading Approach - Questionnaire Evi-
dence from Foreign Exchange, Journal of International Money and Finance, 17,
pp. 547-64.
O b s t f e l d ,M .a n dR o g o ﬀ, K., 1996, Foundations of International Macroeco-
nomics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Shiller, R., 2000, Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press,
Schittenkopf C., Dorﬀner G., Dockner E.,2001, ”On nonlinear, stochastic
dynamics in economics and ﬁnancial time series”, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics
and Econometrics 4(3), pp. 101-121.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 1997, The Limits to Arbitrage, Journal of Fi-
nance, 52(1), 35-55.
Shleifer, A., 2000, Introduction to Behavioural Finance, Clarendon Press.
Simon, H., 1955, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 69, no. 1, 99-118.
Sornette, D., 2003, Why Stock Markets Crash, Princeton University Press.
Taylor, M., and Allen, H., 1992, ”The Use of Technical Analysis in the
Foreign Exchange Market”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 11,
304-14.
Thaler, R., 1994, Quasi Rational Economics, Russell Sage Foundation, New
York.
Tirole, J., 1982, On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expecta-
tions, Econometrica, 50, 1163-1181.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., (1981), The framing of decisions and the
psychology of choice, Science, 211, 453-458.
Wei Shang-Jin and Kim Jungshik 1997. ”The big players in the foreign
exchange market:do they trade on information or noise?”. NBER working paper
6256.
35A Appendix : Numerical values of the parame-
ters used in the base simulation
I nt h ef o l l o w i n gt a b l ew ep r e s e n tt h en u m e r i c a lv a l u e so ft h em o d e l .I nt h eﬁrst
column we listed the parameters of the model, in the second column we present
the numerical values in the base simulations. The last column indicates whether
or not we have performed a sensitivity analysis on these numerical values. If
not, we use the same numerical value in all simulations.
Table 1: Numerical values of parameters








r and r∗ 0 No
B Causality tests between exchange rate and
chartist weight
In this appendix we present the results of causality tests between the exchange
rate and the weight of chartists during a bubble and crash episode. We simulated
the model using the standard set of parameters, and we selected an episode
during which a bubble and crash occurred. We show such an episode in ﬁgure
A2. A visual inspection of the graph reveals that the exchange rate appears
to lead the chartist weight. at least when the bubble starts and later when the
bubble bursts. Note also that the crash occurs faster than the bubble phase, a
f e a t u r ew eo f t e nﬁnd in our simulated bubbles and crashes. This has also been













exchange rate chartist weight
Exchange rate and chartist weight during bubble
Next we performed a Granger causality test on the exchange rate and the
chartist weight during the bubble and crash episode represented in ﬁgure A219.
The result of this causality test is presented in table A1. We observe that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the exchange rate leads the chartists’ weight
during the bubble and crash episode, while we can reject the reverse. We ﬁnd
this feature in most bubble and crash episodes.
19We checked for stationarity and could not reject that the two series are stationary during
the sample period.
37Table 2: Granger causality tests
Null Hypothesis: F-statistic Probability
cw not Granger cause exchange rate 0.377 0.865
exchange rate not Granger cause cw 6.85 6.4E-06
Note: obs=211, lags=5.
38C Example of chaotic attractor
In this appendix we show a chaotic attractor in the phase space obtained for a
particular parameter conﬁguration and a given initial condition (+5). As was
shown in the main text, such attractors are obtained when the current account
is endogenous or when other mean reverting processes are at work. It was also
stressed that the initial conditions determine whether the exchange rate will be
attracted by a chaotic attractor, i.e. some initial conditions lead to a ﬁxed point
solution, others to chaotic attractors.
Figure 14:
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